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Introduction 
The 1840s were a time of drastic changes in South Asia. The English 
East India Company (EIC), then in its final decade as sovereign, had 
grown into a veritable Leviathan, completing the painting of the entire 
subcontinent in imperial red with a double phased conquest of the 
Punjab during the "Anglo-Sikh Wars" of 1845-46 and 1848-49. With 
borders now stretching to Afghanistan in the northwest and the Hima-
layan states in the north, British officials and businessmen scanned the 
extended horizon for new threats and opportunities in agreement with 
the modern iteration of the empire’s 'gentleman capitalism' (Cain & 
Hopkins 2016: 308-29). The establishment and recruitment of a 
burgeoning tea industry in the Kangra and Kullu Valleys of the Punjab 
Hills (nowadays districts in Himachal Pradesh, India) to further the 
interests of empire in High Asia exemplifies this process.  
This paper examines the practicalities of imperial expansion efforts 
across the Himalaya through the combination of private and govern-
mental agents. As part of the strategies that underlay the competition 
between certain circles of decision-makers in the British and Russian 
governments for influence in Asia (alias "Great Game"), these practi-
calities entailed the harnessing of British colonisers’ efforts at tea 
cultivation for the benefit of establishing ties with Ya’qub Beg’s inde-
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pendent Kashgaria (1864-77). The pact between planters and propo-
nents of the Forward School of British diplomacy manifests in repeated 
missions to Yarkand and in the establishment of a trans-Himalayan fair 
at Palampur circa 1867-79. Advancing British imperial interests and 
private profits from a rising demand for tea across the globe, the 
initiative demonstrates the 'imperialism of free trade' in action. As in 
other parts of India, the reshaping of the Himalayan foothills in mod-
ernity can be traced to the by-lanes of industrialising England.  
Early colonisation in Kangra, 1846-67 
The tenth child of a Liverpudlian merchant, Sir Thomas Douglas 
Forsyth (1827-86) ranks among the pioneer of British rule in Kangra. 
Having disembarked in Calcutta in March 1848, the EIC novice 
advanced to the post of deputy commissioner in the Punjabi township 
of Pakpattan within just one year. Contracting illness shortly after, 
Forsyth travelled to Simla to recuperate. He there came under the 
patronage of Governor-General Dalhousie (1848-56), who appointed 
him assistant commissioner of the summer capital, where he also 
marred. By 1850 he had regained sufficient health to assume a posi-
tion in the Kangra Valley, where he spent four blissful years that he 
would posteriorly describe as 'the nearest perfection to official life.' 
Indeed,  
[s]ituated in a lovely valley, surrounded by snow-clad mountains,
and having to deal with a simple mountaineer race, the English
officer exercised a sort of patriarchal sway very much unfettered,
for it was too early in the era of administration for codes and
regulations to be enforced on an outlying mountain district.
Justice was often as not administered in the open air under a
tree, and the word of 'Hakim' was accepted as law. A strong bond
between the ruler and the people existed, and thus the most
pleasant relations were established. Before a road could be made
or a bridge built, the district officer's opinion always had to be
taken – nothing, in fact, could be done without his intervention.
(Forsyth 1887: 14f.)
The assistant commissioner’s reminiscences reflect the heady mixture 
of romantic and authoritarian sentiments that fuelled his work in the 
valley. These efforts were not solely intended for the benefit of its 
"simple" inhabitants. Upholding Dalhousie’s expansionist policy, 
Forsyth was to actively encourage retired military officers and private 
entrepreneurs to settle in the valley of mild climate by promoting its 
lands as a cheap and viable option for cultivating tea. Lured by gener-
ous funding schemes, business minded-settlers heeded the call with 
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hopes of emulating the prosperous tea industry that had begun blos-
soming in Assam and Bengal in the preceding decades.2  
The first plantation estates were sponsored by government as early 
as 1850, to which Forsyth added several more. Within a year of his 
appointment, over 1,000 acres of land, 'untouched by the people on 
account of some local superstition', were allotted to the scheme by the 
officer’s industrious patron, Lord Dalhousie.3 A specially designated 
officer (Edward Paske) was trained to identify and negotiate the pur-
chase of lands appropriate for tea cultivation from landholding elites. 
The relatively high altitude, nutrient rich-soils that received abundant 
rainfall along the eastern slopes of the Dhaula Dhar were particularly 
prized. Once purchased, these were sold to government- and pri-
vately-owned enterprises that enjoyed a steady supply of saplings free 
of charge from government run-nurseries in Kumaon.  
The misperception of the Kangra and Kullu Valleys—then still 
comprising one district—as 'entirely free from malarious fever' was 
presented as an exceptional incentive for colonisation.4 For, unlike 
their colleagues in Assam, who were forced to abandon their planta-
tions with the onset of the monsoons to avoid the lethal diseases un-
leashed by the rains, the Kangra planters could remain in their estates 
throughout the year. Proponents of the tea industry advanced this as a 
singular advantage, sine 'the success of a plantation must depend on 
the physical energy and close personal supervision of the owner or 
manager.'5 If that were not enough, the transport of produce from the 
plantations to regional markets was entirely covered by the govern-
ment, which supplied corvée or unpaid labour by adopting the pre-
existing tradition of 'begar', in which local peasants would periodically 
provide services to their landlords free of cost.6  
The measures that were devised for developing the tea industry 
persisted well after Forsyth’s departure from Kangra in 1854. The bulk 
of the plantations concentrated along the elevated slopes of tehsil 
'Palam' at the north-eastern end of the Kangra Valley, where the 
climatic and geophysical conditions were optimal, and a township 
developed in its midst. The initial investments began to bear fruit in 
the early 1860s, prompting local entrepreneurs to join the industry 
that they had till then viewed with suspicion (Lyall 1874: 81). 
Reporting on a tour through the district, the Lieutenant-Governor of 
the Punjab counted 47 estates, from which he was 'frequently 
besieged by zemindars [landholders] exhibiting samples of tea' that 
they had cultivated in 'their own fields' (Anon. 1866: xxix). The Lieu-
tenant-Governor’s enthusiasm notwithstanding, the parcelling of lands 
between colonisers and locals was tainted with inequalities: the planta-
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tions belonging to locals amounted to a mere 399 acres in comparison 
with 2,723 acres held by Europeans, of which 'only about a fourth' was 
'actually planted with tea' (Lyall 1874: 81).  
Despite the disadvantages inherent to the colonial condition, within 
twenty years of its annexation the Kanga Valley Tea industry had 
acquired a place of pride among administrators, colonisers, and locals 
alike. Punjabi businessmen flocked to 'the only European colony in the 
centre of the Tea districts'7 in Palampur, where they set up shops that 
targeted markets throughout the subcontinent, as well as in Afghani-
stan, Ladakh, and Central Asia (Minhas 1998: 162). The latter two 
markets were particularly interesting insofar as their unique demand 
for green tea required local experimentation with new strands in the 
plantation estates. Ladakhi merchants were soon invited to inspect 
samples from government plantations, which they estimated favour-
ably at nearly triple the going rate at the time (Anon. 1866: xxxii). If 
the Ladakhi assessment promised to break new grounds by reaching 
Tibetan and Central Asian consumers, it also gave hope of expanding 
British influence across the Himalaya; an aim that was avidly pursued 
by the revenant Douglas Forsyth upon his return to the region in 1865. 
'A Project of Imperial Importance': Palampur Fair, 1867-79 
With the majestic Dhaula Dhar beckoning on the horizon, the Divisional 
Commissioner of Jalandhar was much delighted with the developments 
in Kangra since his departure some ten years earlier. Now in his late 
thirties, Forsyth had returned to the hills a somewhat changed man. 
Hardened by the events of 1857-58, in which he had played an active 
part on several fronts, the commissioner had become acutely wary of 
internal and external threats to empire. A vociferous proponent of the 
Forward School of British politics in India, Forsyth was earnestly 
focused on countering the expansion of Russian hegemony through 
Central Asia; that his appointment coincided with the conquest of 
'Western Turkmenistan' did little to abate these concerns.8  
In order to counter Tsarist expansionism, Forsyth turned to the 
tested means of trade and commerce, and to the Kangra Tea Industry 
in particular. London born-Robert Shaw (1839-79), the owner of the 
Khanyara plantation near the military cantonment of Dharamsala, 
emerged as a key facilitator of the commissioner’s plans and one that 
he was soon 'glad to be able to call' a 'friend' (Forsyth 1868-69: 200). 
Unable to join military service due to frail health—rheumatic fever 
contracted at childhood had left him with a defective heart that was a 
constant bother on his journeys—Shaw reached the valley in 1859 
following a brief period of studies at Cambridge. By the time he 
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teamed up with Forsyth, Shaw was already intimately familiar with the 
hills through several exploratory trips that would have substantiated 
their growing friendship; and while the tea business may have helped 
pay the bills, Shaw’s passions clearly laid in the exploration of the 
lands and cultures of the Himalaya.  
When news of Ya’qub Beg’s successful rebellion against China (in 
1864) and subsequent establishment of an independent state in East 
Turkistan (present day-Xinjiang) reached India, the notion of breach-
ing the Himalayan barrier into Central Asia transitioned from an impro-
bable fantasy into an almost attainable reality.9 Forsyth and Shaw 
proposed to accomplish this vision by founding a fair in British 
territory. Tailored to attract merchants from East Turkistan, the fair 
was to link British and Central Asian interests through trade and would 
ultimately lead to the opening a permanent residency in the capital of 
Kashgar. Shaw and Forsyth would emerge as a key facilitator in this 
initiative.  
Expansionist minded-advocates of the Forward School welcomed the 
plan as a means for countering Russian influence in Asia, while the 
Kangra Valley planters could reap new profits from its untapped mar-
kets. This was especially important for cultivators of green tea, who 
sought to replace China as chief supplier of the product following 
Ya’qub Beg’s severing of ties with the Qing dynasty (Shaw 1871: 17). 
The plantation and transport hub of Palampur emerged as a natural 
venue for the fair. Equipped with experience, prestige, and the support 
of local planters, Forsyth easily persuaded government that the initia-
tive was 'a project of imperial importance' and within a couple of years 
he had gained final approval for the plan.  
The inauguration of the 'Palampur Fair' on 28 October 1867 was a 
celebratory event that was held in the presence of prominent British 
officials, local leaders, and a large crowd of participants. Despite hav-
ing won accolades in government circles, the fair disappointed the 
planters. The official returns on record indicate that the traders from 
Central Asia were primarily interested in fabrics, metal utensils, and 
'European goods', while tea constituted a mere ten per cent of Indian 
sales. This was especially disconcerting for Shaw, who had devoted his 
estate to the exclusive cultivation of green tea with a view to pioneer-
ing the trade with East Turkistan. And although he could have also 
targeted nearer markets in Ladakh and Kashmir, where green tea was 
also in demand, it seems that Shaw’s zeal for profit was secondary to 
his interest in actually reaching Kashgar himself. Thus, while the 
majority of planters continued to cast their net wide by investing in the 
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'safe' commodity of black tea,10 the Kanyara planter took active meas-
ures to penetrate the trans-Himalayan market. 
Emboldened by Forsyth’s 'unbounded enthusiasm for the cause', 
Shaw headed a political convoy to Kashgar with the opening of the 
mountain passes the next spring, becoming the first Englishman to 
visit the region. Although not an official representative of government, 
Shaw hoped to persuade Ya’qub Beg to improve commercial ties with 
British India by packing a large quantity of green tea from his estate 
(Shaw 1871: 72).11 A few months later Forsyth set off on a parallel 
mission to St. Petersburg (via Europe) with the blessings of the Vice-
roy, Lord Mayo (1869-72), a fellow supporter of the Forward School. 
The negotiations with the Tsar and 'his enlightened minister' resulted 
in an agreement that temporarily clarified the balance of imperial 
powers in Central Asia: the Russians would withdraw the forces that 
they had earlier dispatched beyond the Oxus and refrain from entering 
Afghanistan, thereby securing the independence of East Turkistan, 
which would remain free to trade with Russians and Britons alike. What 
Lord Mayo had rightly celebrated as a diplomatic success, also renewed 
the hopes of Forsyth, Shaw, and their associates regarding the fair at 
Palampur. The agreements had placed the British initiative on an equal 
footing with its competition, the grand fair at Nizhny Novgorod. The 
latter event was described by a Yarkandi merchant as a grander 
version of the 'Plampoor Fair' that lasted 'thirty days every year: ten 
days for cash transactions, ten days for barter, and ten days for deal-
ings on credit' (Shaw 1871: 400).12  
The efforts of Forsyth and Shaw seemed to bear fruit in the third fair 
(of 1869), which was timed to coincide with Lord Mayo’s visit to 
Kangra. The event had attracted enormous crowds in what was destin-
ed to be the last surge in Central Asian trade at Palampur. Nearly half 
a million rupees’ worth of Yarkandi merchandise was sold at the fair, 
the bulk of which 'was purchased by two very enterprising gentlemen, 
who had at once the local prosperity of Palumpore, and the trade of 
Central Asia, at heart' (Anon. 1872: 3). The substantial investments of 
the 'two gentlemen' are indicative of the tenuous state of trade 
relations with East Turkistan, which required the continual engagement 
of its benefactors were they to survive. 
Forsyth attempted to build on the momentum of the third fair by 
leading two additional expeditions to Yarkand. His first visit took place 
in 1870, when he was requested to accompany an envoy that Ya’qub 
Beg had sent to enquire into relations with the British on his return 
journey. This visit provoked a Russian response that resulted in a 
treaty that was signed with Ya’qub Beg in 1872, in which a 2.5 per 
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cent tax limit was set on Russian goods and which allowed the Tsar’s 
commercial agents (caravanbashis) to assume positioned in the 
various cities of East Turkistan. The British responded with a second, 
ambitious visit by Forsyth in 1873-74. Bearing the title of special 
envoy to the Queen, Forsyth was intended to equalise Britain’s trading 
rights with those of Russia, and an agreement setting the same tax 
ceiling on goods coming from India was concluded in 1874 (Alder 
1963: 41-4).13  
Intelligence gathering efforts about the passage of goods and 
taxation in Kashmiri controlled-Ladakh paralleled these expeditions. 
The Punjab Government appointed Dr Henry Cayley EIC envoy to the 
Ladakhi capital of Leh in 1867. Having established a dispensary in Leh, 
Cayley conducted clandestine investigations with his patients alongside 
his practice of medicine (Bray 2015). The three summers he had spent 
there provided sufficient data for concluding a commercial treaty with 
the raja of Jammu and Kashmir that established a 'joint commissioner-
ship' in Ladakh. Staffed by representatives of the Kashmiri and EIC 
authorities, the commissioners were to monitor the traffic in Yarkandi 
merchandise and to ensure that it was equitably taxed. Having already 
visited Leh in 1870, Shaw was well positioned to man the post—on 
Forsyth’s recommendation—becoming the first joint commissioner of 
Ladakh in the summer of 1871 (Bray 2015: 88-91).  
Although he was now an official employee of the political depart-
ment of the British Indian government, Shaw also had a fair deal of 
private business to attend to. Apart from the plantation in Kanyara, 
this was a prime opportunity for advancing the interests of the Central 
Asian Trading Company that he had founded and was a co-partner in, 
and whose mission was to systematically explore the potential markets 
of Central Asia. An official visit to Kashgar in 1875 was consequently 
used to deliver consignments from the Kanyara plantation to business 
partners, while his partner in the venture became a permanent 
resident of Yarkand.14 
These encouraging signs were quickly dispelled. During the same 
visit, Ya’qub Beg updated Shaw—in his capacity as government 
official—that he shall not be ratifying the terms of trade that Forsyth 
had negotiated in the preceding year. This would agree with the recent 
assessments of Ya’qub Beg’s reign, which indicate he was a shrewd 
strategist who capably played Russians and Britons against each other 
rather than as a pawn in the 'Great Game' that has characterised 
standard Euro-centric writings on the topic (Kim 2004: 138-58). 
Regardless of these developments, within two years the trade with 
India had been reduced to nil, as the reconquest of Kashgar by the 
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Qing (in 1877) put an end to what few Yarkandi merchants who still 
dared traverse the mountains, reducing the international fair in Palam-
pur to a strictly local event (Minhas 1998: 162).15  
As the Palampur Fair receded into the shadows, the planters in 
Kangra were made to reconsider their future plans. Divested of the 
strategic importance they had held for policy makers; the plantation 
owners experienced a dramatic reduction in the financial support from 
government. The plummet from vanguards of empire to small time-
capitalists on the fringes of British India left a bitter taste among the 
planters, who perceived the shift in policy as abandonment. The plan-
tations and estates were gradually sold off to businessmen and 
politically dominant families in the region and their produce sensibly 
directed to more easily accessible markets than Central Asia.16 By the 
turn of the century, a second generation-planter in Baijnath would pro-
nounce the 'golden age of Douglas Forsyth' a relic of the past, and the 
later history of the fair that he had labored hard to establish as having 
'dwindled down to a drunken, drumming, dancing crowd of ragged 
Guddis [shepherds], and then died away altogether' (Fitzgerald 1902: 
23, 25).17 If the declining fortunes of Palamur Fair can be plausibly 
attributed to geopolitical shifts in the Asian Highlands, the details of 
these changes and their effects on the Kangra Tea Industry are reveal-
ing of the multiple processes that affected the Himalayan transition to 
modernity in the era of the Great Game.  
Appraising the Fair and its failure 
There are several reasons for the Palampur Fair’s collapse that may be, 
for heuristic purposes, divided between the broad fields of geography, 
politics and commerce. As a rule, the bulk of Central Asian trade with 
India was conducted along the traditional high road via Afghanistan, 
Balkh, and Bukhara. In promoting the arduous route to Kashgar from 
Palampur via Leh, Forsyth was responding to the contingencies of 
international politics. By the 1860s, Russia was already firmly 
entrenched in West Turkistan, which was aptly described by a contem-
porary as 'Russian Turkistan'. With contiguous tracts leading all across 
Central Asia into the Russian heartland (Nizhny Novgorod), the trade 
with West Turkistan offered Kashgar and its traders’ easy access to 
European goods and markets through the well-trodden trails of the Silk 
Road (Murchison 1870: 315). By way of contrast, the road to Palampur 
consisted of a series of daunting passes that limited the Yarkandi 
merchants to bi-annual visits at best. It is no wonder then, that the 
route came to be recognised as 'the worst trade route in the whole 
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wide world' (Keay 2000: 262) soon after the fair in Palampur had shut 
down.  
The insistent attempts at 'breaching' these markets also failed to 
recognise the interests of East Turkistan society. The Kirghiz popula-
tion, for one, remains largely pastoral-nomadic and thus primarily 
geared towards securing pasturelands for grazing. The exchange of 
commodities has consequently been limited to specialist communities 
and selected families whose networks span the Himalayan divide (Rizvi 
1999). The British would have been aware of these practices from their 
experience in other parts of the Himalaya. For example, the trade 
between the sparsely inhabited frontier of the Rajput kingdom of 
Bashahr (nowadays in Himachal Pradesh, India) and West Tibet during 
the nineteenth century was maintained by some 400 Kinnauri merch-
ants, who amounted to less than one per cent of the state’s overall 
population (Kanwar 1999: 73). 
The colonial records’ stress on trade, reinforced as it was by pro-
ponents of the Forward School, ended up distorting the socio-political 
realities of life on the steppe, which revolved around the pressing 
concern of acquiring pasture lands. The spilling of the rivalry between 
Hunza and Kirghiz tribesmen over these territories into the mercantile 
realm was consequently presented as the 'raids' of frontier savages 
over civilised 'trading convoys.'18 The rising volume of trade that 
reached India via the Ladakh thus concerned but a small segment of 
Ya’qub Beg’s subjects and would partly explain the continual volatility 
of the Palamur Fair during the years of its existence (Shaw 1871: 3). 
The trajectory of the Kangra Tea industry similarly illustrates the 
fair’s incompatibility with existing trade patterns. The attempts at 
penetrating Central Asia through the selling of green tea remained 
limited to Shaw, whereas the remainder of planters cultivated black 
and blended varieties to meet unprecedented demands for the product 
across the globe. Easily accessible through the railhead at Jalandhar, 
the expanding rail network of India delivered Kangra grown-tea to 
various markets in and beyond the subcontinent. The trains would 
have also benefited the odd planters who actually cultivated green tea 
for sale in the markets of Afghanistan, Kashmir (and Ladakh), and 
West Turkistan by forwarding their goods to intermediary traders in 
Amritsar. Recalling that the transport of goods from the valley to the 
road- and railheads in the Punjab was free, the planters would have 
surely preferred these to the troublesome trail blazed by Shaw.  
In terms of profitability, the premise that guided Shaw in his 
venture, according to which East Turkistan was critically lacking in 
green tea as a result of its severed ties with China, proved to be poorly 
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grounded. According to Russian archival sources, the bulk of tea selling 
establishments in nineteenth century Bukhara and Samarkhand were 
run by Indians who sold 'Bombay Tea', an appellation for green tea 
that was shipped from China to Bombay and then carried overland via 
Afghanistan (Levi 2002: 51). It follows that the extensive trade that 
existed between East and West Turkistan would have ensured a 
continuous supply of Chinese green tea regardless of Kashgaria’s 
political relations with the Qing. That the network of merchants and 
interlocutors that managed the trade in 'Bombay Tea' actually 
succeeded in reaping profits despite the circuitous route of their 
commodities is testimony to the robustness of global capitalism in the 
1860s. The chances of competing with such a substantiated network 
were thus fairly slim and strongly resonant with the British failure in 
competing with China over the Tibetan market (Booz 2011).  
Shortly after Shaw withdrew from the valley, the production of 
green tea in Kangra was brought to a halt. By 1892 the plantations 
were devoted to the exclusive production of black and blended varie-
ties that were sold in near equal measure to the London and Calcutta 
markets (Minhas 1998: 143). A more sober appraisal of the place of 
Kangra Tea in the wider field of Indian tea production reveals it was a 
far cry from the inflated accounts of its proponents in the Forward 
School. While the Kangra estates may have loomed over similar plan-
tations in the region in terms of size, quality, and productivity, these 
achievements were miniscule in comparison with the mammoth 
expansion of the industry in coeval Assam and Darjeeling. During the 
1880s, Kangra produced twice the quantity of tea than the plantations 
in Garhwal and Kumaon had, but only a thirtieth of the output of 
Darjeeling and Assam, where estates fitted for mass production were 
apace of rising demands in Britain, America, and Australia (Clarke 
1881; Sharma 2011). The rhetoric that sought to market Kangra as 
the future of Indian tea is thus best understood as a local success 
story rather than as an integral part of the development of Indian Tea.  
The obstacles placed by geophysics and economics were compound-
ed by the political subordination of Ladakh to Jammu and Kashmir. 
Maharaja Ranbir Singh (1856-85) was renowned for his fierce protec-
tion of autonomy. Having opposed the appointment of a British Resi-
dent in Srinagar for most of his reign—an appointee could only be sent 
when the maharaja had grown infirm—the ruler had little to gain from 
British competition in trade (Rai 2004: 80-127). The border between 
Kashgaria and Ladakh, wrote an alarmed Forsyth, had indeed enabled 
the maharaja to 'extend his influence, and represent himself, and not 
the British Government, as the great power' in dealings with Ya’qub 
Beg.19 The result were hefty levies on transit duties for Yarkandi mer-
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chants passing through Ladakh. As iterated above, this conflict was 
resolved after lengthy negotiations that culminated in the establish-
ment of a joint commissionership for the Kahsmiri and British authori-
ties in Ladakh, whose first representative was Robert Shaw.20  
Far from laying the issue to rest, the agreement was reciprocated by 
the maharaja’s cultivation of ties with political leaders along the 
Palampur-Leh route well inside British territory. The lord (thakur) of 
Lahaul, whose territories connected the valley of Kullu with Ladakh, 
was granted financial assistance with the aim of tapping into the rising 
volume of trade in his territories. When Forsyth discovered the thakur 
had been sending 'money and iron' as tribute to Kashmir, he immedi-
ately demanded an increase in government support to the Lahauli 
dependant so as to 'to remove him from all temptation' of collaborating 
with Kashmir.21 The undermining of British authority aside, this motion 
would have also been prompted by the centrality of Lahauli merchants 
in the regional cycle of economic activities.  
The Lahauli traders used to dominate the Dasara in Kullu in 
September-October, from where they would proceed to the Lavi Fair in 
Bashahr in November (Kanwar 1999: 64). The fair in Palampur was 
timed to begin ten days after Dasara in order to allow the Lahauli 
traders sufficient time to reach Palampur. The returns from the first 
fair indicate that some Lahauli traders had indeed broken their habitual 
cycle as nearly half the goods sold consisted of grain and gram flour, 
products traditionally bought by Lahauli and Spiti traders in return for 
their woolens, drugs and ponies (Anon. 1864: xvii). The enlistment of 
the thakur’s son as a member of the official expedition of 1873-74 was 
similarly aimed at deepening the ties between Lahauli merchants and 
their counterparts in East Turkistan.  
Successful as the British intervention in Lahaul may have been, it 
ultimately targeted only one of numerous routes that connected the 
Western Himalaya with Central Asia. The strategic location of the 
kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir at the crossroads of a large number of 
these routes, the vastness of its dominions, and the integration of its 
diverse regional components through nodal partners endowed it with 
advantages that put the Palampur Fair to shame. For one, a substan-
tial network of Kashmiri merchants had already been established in the 
markets towns of East Turkistan for at least half a century before the 
'gentlemen capitalists' of Kangra attempted to breach the frontier. The 
authorities in Srinagar offered significant concessions to merchants in 
state service to advance a profitable trade in East Turkistan pashmina 
wool that was converted into shawls by Kashmiri looms. The sate 
sponsored-traders bought the much-valued pashmina (considered 
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superior even to that of West Tibet) from compatriots who had settled 
in Kashgaria in earlier decades to considerable profit for all parties.22 
The sheer breadth of this trade network suggests an exceedingly 
better grasp of regional opportunities and customs than the mono-
pathed route to Palampur.23 
The monopolisation of trade by the state that characterised both 
British and Kashmiri authorities reveals the fallacies behind the imperi-
alism of free trade. Under the guise of 'opening' new arenas to 
commercial exchange, the technological and fiscal advantages of 
Britain had accustomed its servants to triumph. The Palampur Fair is 
interesting for demonstrating the limits of these means. A comparison 
of the trade statistics of British India with Yarkand and with Jammu 
and Kashmir is instructive in this regard. In the final year of the fair, 
the total sum of Yarkandi imports and exports was valued at 25,000 
pounds (or 250,000 rupees), while the exchanges between Jammu and 
Kashmir and British India were set at 700,000 pounds (or 7 million 
rupees), nearly thirty times the volume of Central Asian goods traded 
in Palampur.24 With extensive contiguous borders reaching into mar-
kets throughout Asia and with a fiercely independent ruler at its head, 
Jammu and Kashmir had thwarted the imperial project to reap 
handsome profits and sustain its supreme position in trans-Himalayan 
trade; a position that no sporadic undermining, not even the Palampur 
Fair, could upset.  
Conclusion 
British colonisation changed the Kangra Valley landscape. Bridges, 
roads, tea gardens and the township of Palampur developed with 
surprising speed during the first decades of British rule, granting novel 
opportunities for colonisers, Punjabis, and locals. By the 1860s, these 
developments were incorporated into an imperial manoeuvre that 
sought to expand British influence into Central Asia. With an ambitious 
'imperial project' at its core, the tea gardens of the hills briefly shone 
bright through the stubborn efforts of 'two enterprising gentlemen', 
only to succumb to the exigencies of global capital trends and regional 
geopolitics a decade later. The failure of Palampur Fair is revealing of 
the limits of British imperialism in High Asia. The constraints of geo-
graphy, politics and commercial expediency dashed the hopes of its 
visionary founders, whose dealings reveal a zealous ambition that 
might just have come in the way of prudence.  
By the late 1870s, the animating spirits of Palampur Fair had gone 
their separate ways. Forsyth returned to England in 1876, where he 
made an unsuccessful attempt at politics only to become the chairman 
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of an Indian railway company until his death in 1886. Shaw remained 
with the political department and was appointed resident at Mandalay 
in 1878, where he unexpectedly passed away the following year.25  
Although they had embarked on seemingly different careers, the 
two remained extremely attached to the Kangra Valley and Central 
Asian affairs throughout their lives. The findings of their expeditions 
were published in books and journals that offered Europeans insights 
into largely unexplored territories, the majority appearing in public-
ations of the Royal Geographic Society and Royal Asiatic Society. 
Forsyth had also published a short guide entitled Trade routes between 
northern India and Central Asia at some point in the 1860s, whereas 
Shaw wrote a number of treatises on Central Asian languages. An 
account of their joint explorations during the expedition of 1870 
appeared as a book during their lifetime (Henderson & Hume 1873).  
After his death, the wife and daughters of Douglas Forsyth installed 
a memorial plaque in the church he had helped found in Palampur 'to 
record his great affection for this spot' (Forsyth 1887: 282). Robert 
Shaw’s passion for the cultures and languages of Central Asia accom-
panied him until his last days in Burma, where his notes and studies 
occupied an entire chamber in the British residency.26 Their legacy of 
exploration was sustained by Shaw’s nephew, Sir Francis Young-
husband, who is primarily remembered in connection with the British 
invasion of Tibet in 1903-04, but perhaps no less importantly, in the 
serene panoramas of tea plantations that still beckon visitors to 
Kangra today.  
Endnotes 
1 My thanks to the University of Rome (La Sapienza) for permission to use Moran (2009) as the 
kernel to this expanded and updated paper. Additional thanks to John Bray and Elena di Rossi 
Filibeck for facilitating contacts, and for generous sharing of sources.   
2 On the role of tea in reconfiguring Assam under the British, see Sharma (2011). 
3 Paske to Coxe, 8 July 1860 (referencing purchased made in the 1850s), cited in Anon (1869: 3). 
On the tensions between landholders, colonisers, and government representatives over 
individual and communally owned ("waste") lands, see Lyall (1874: 80-2).  
4 National Archives of India (NAI), Foreign Department Proceedings, General A, No. 5, January 
1868, "Honb'le Mr. Taylor’s account of a tour from Simla to Umritsur and Lahore," (hereafter 
Taylor account) p. 6. 
5 Ibid. 
6 The subsequent attempts of government at regulating begar were met with resistance on the 
part of the colonisers, who deemed them 'unnecessary and dangerous to all parties employing 
large numbers of coolies, such as the PWD [Public Works Department] and the planters' (Anon 
1872: 16).  
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7 Forsyth to Miller, 6 May 1867, cited in Anon (1864: vi). 
8 On the Forward School’s policies in the region see Alder (1963) and Warikoo (1989); for an 
excellent complementary outline of Russian engagements on the Chinese borderland, see 
Morrison (2019). For captivating summaries of British and Indian adventurers in nineteenth 
century-High Asia, see Hopkirk (1990), Keay (2000), and Waller (1990).  
9 On Ya’qub Beg in Kashgar, see Kim (2004). 
10 Out of seventeen officially recognised plantations—eleven in Kangra and six in Kullu—green 
tea was only cultivated in one other estate apart from Shaw’s, and that too alongside the black 
variety (Anon 1869: 27). 
11 On Shaw’s journey in the context of Russio-British rivalry in Central Asia, see Keay (2000: 212-
62).  
12 Forsyth was personally familiar with the fair at Nizhny Novgorod from a visit in 1864; Forsyth to 
Miller, 12 November 1867, cited in Anon (1864: xi). 
13 The agreements are reproduced in Kim (2004: 187-93). 
14 Shaw and his partner, Andrew Dalgeish, remain the only Europeans to have traversed the 
Himalaya into Xinjiang as private traders in the entire history of British India. Dalgeish remained 
in Yarkand as their company’s agent, then liquidator, and ultimately set up his own business. He 
was assassinated in his tent in the Karakoram Mountains in 1888. For a fascinating narrative of 
these events, see Keay (2000: 259-62).  
15 The effects of the political change in Kashgar could only fully be gauged in 1879, since the 
distance to Palampur dictated a bi-annual cycle for visits by Central Asian merchants.  
16  The great earthquake of Kangra in 1905 saw the last of the European owned plantations 
transfer to Indian hands, see Minhas (1998: 122-5). 
17 Fitzgerald’s father was co-owner of the Baijnath Tea Estate near Palampur; the 'guddis' 
(gaddis) are pastoral nomads who migrate between lands in the Kangra Valley and the mountains 
of Bara Banghal to its north.  
18 The long-term effects of the colonial emphasis on trade are apparent among today’s Hunza, 
who deny the historical evidence for their ancestry in pastoral-nomad tribes to claim provenance 
with 'caravan traders' (Hussain 2006). On contemporary Kirghiz society, consult Shahrani (2002); 
on the latter’s tributary relations with Qing China, see di Cosmo (2003). 
19 Extract from Forsyth’s letter in Taylor account, p. 5. 
20 For informative discussions of these negotiations Warikoo (1989: 134-50). For a detailed 
investigation of the interests that fueled them, see Rizvi (1999: 182-208). 
21 Forsyth to Thornton, 14 September 1866, p. 5, and Annex in Thornton to Wyllie, 10 January 
1867, p. 6 in "Copy of correspondence between the Secretary of State for India and the Governor 
General in Council, relating to the Appointment of a COMMERCIAL AGENT in Ladakh, and to his 
Proceedings there," UK House of Commons Parliamentary Paper, Command no. 147. My thanks 
to John Bray for sharing his copy of this source. 
22 A decline in European demand for Kashmiri shawls after 1870 reduced the importance of 
Kashmiri traders in East Turkistan, whose progeny has since abandoned long distance-trade; see 
Rizvi (1999: 182-208) and (Rai 2004: 153).  
23 The incapacity of the Palampur Fair’s advocates to engage in monetary dealings 'on any 
excessive scale' with the Yarkandi merchants who visited the site is telling of the gap between 
imperial ambition and local knowledge, as the Yarkandis strongly preferred barter; see the report 
on the Kangra tea industry of 1872 by Edward Paske, the EIC’s former broker of land acquisitions 
in Kangra, as quoted in Minhas (1998: 141).  
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24 The trade between Ladakh and British India for the same year was estimated at 17,000 pounds 
(Clarke 1881: 554-7). 
25 Forsyth was sent to Burma in 1875 to discuss political control of the Kayin State in the 
southeastern part of the country with the king. Given the friendship between the two, it is not 
unlikely that Forsyth had assisted in Shaw’s subsequent nomination to the region.  
26 IOR Mss Eur F197/50, Phayre to Younghusband, 20 July 1879, fo. 10. 
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